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The outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) continues to spread through West Africa. Since the first report of EVD in
March 2014, the number of cases has increased rapidly, with the fatality rate of >50%. The most prevalent Ebola
virus belongs to the species of Zaire ebolavirus, with a fatality rate as high as 90%. Although there were cases
introduced into other continents, Africa is the endemic area where fruit bats and apes are suspected to be Ebola
virus carriers. The virus might be transmitted from the host animals to humans if humans consume raw or not fully
cooked and contaminated meats. However, human-to-human transmission via close contact is the major route of
current outbreaks. EVD can occur during any season and affect people of any race and age group. Direct contact
with body fluids of EVD patients or living in contaminated environments greatly increases the risk of being infected.
Transmission via aerosol less likely, but transmission via virus-containing droplets is possible in humans. Thus, health
care providers are facing danger of getting Ebola virus infection. To date, vaccines, drugs and/or therapies to prevent
Ebola virus infection or treat EVD are limited. Medical workers should follow the current standard prophylactic procedures.
The military can orchestrate efficient care to mass EVD patients. Although it is necessary to speed up the pace of
developing effective vaccine and therapeutics for the prevention and treatment of EVD, public health prevention
and management should be important issue at present to control the spread of this disease cost-effectively.
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Ebola virus disease (EVD), formerly known as Ebola
haemorrhagic fever (EHF), is an acute, severe and fatal
disease in humans. In February 2014, the first case of
EVD occurred in Guinea, followed by a rapid growth of
the EVD epidemic within the next nine months in West
Africa. According to the World Health Organization
(WHO) update on January 21 2015, EVD had infected
828 medical personnel and caused 499 deaths. By January
23 2015, a total of 21,832 cases or suspected cases, and
8,690 deaths have been reported in Guinea, Liberia, Sierra
Leone, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and elsewhere [1]. Outside
of West Africa, imported EVD patients in the United
States and Spain caused worldwide panic. A model of
Ebola transmission, which was developed based on the in-
cidence data from Liberia, predicted that the epidemic of
EVD might continue in early 2015 [2]. Thus, this outbreak* Correspondence: gcao@smmu.edu.cn
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humans [3].
Ebola virus is the pathogen of EVD, which is mainly
endemic in West Africa. Ebola virus is named after a
small river in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, DRC) where the first EVD outbreak occurred in
1976 [4]. Ebola virus is characterized by high lethality,
high infectivity, and lack of effective treatment or
prophylaxis. Considering the possibility of imported in-
fection and the use for biological terrorism, Ebola virus
becomes not only a public health problem to Africa, but
also a worldwide bio-threat. This pathogen is listed as a
Category A Bioterrorism Agent by the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) [5].
A number of investigational treatments for this fatal
disease have been conducted. The main directions of
prophylaxis and treatments focus on the development of
vaccines, antibody therapies, and antiviral drugs [6]. The
promising candidates of these strategies are as follows:
Two vectored vaccines, which are based on replication-
incompetent chimpanzee adenovirus 3 (cAd3) ands is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
rg/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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have demonstrated 100% protection in non-human pri-
mates for 4 to 5 weeks and are undergoing the phase 1
trials [7,8]. Zmap, a combination of 3 monoclonal anti-
bodies, can reverse advanced disease and lead to full re-
covery in primates under laboratory conditions [9].
Brincidofovir and TKM-Ebola, agents with antiviral ac-
tivity against EBOV in vitro, can be used for antiviral
therapy and are also amenable for mass production [6].
Although all of these candidate therapies have enormous
potential in clinical applications, most are in the early phase
of development, and authorized only for emergency use.
The primary therapeutic strategy for EVD is still
symptomatic and/or supportive treatments. The main
strategies to control the EVD outbreak have been mainly
public health endeavors focusing on epidemiological sur-
veillance, contact tracing, and quarantine [2]. Here, we
briefly reviewed the epidemiology, virology, and infec-
tious process of EVD, especially the infectious process




EVD is not an immunogenic disease with specific natural
seasonality, and it can spread throughout the year as sug-
gested by the historical data of Ebola epidemic outbreaks
(Table 1). In 1976, the first reported EVD outbreaks oc-
curred in Sudan [10] and DRC [4]. Sudan ebolavirus
(SUDV) and Zaire ebolavirus (EBOV), which caused these
two epidemics, respectively, were the first two human-
pathogenic Ebolavirus species isolated. Within a longTable 1 Epidemic outbreaks of Ebola virus disease in Africa, 1
Year Starting month Area Species
1976 June South Sudan SUDV
1976 September DRC EBOV
1979 October South Sudan SUDV
1994 June Gabon EBOV
1995 April DRCa EBOV
1996 February Gabon EBOV
2000 August Uganda SUDV
2001 October DRC/Gabon EBOV
2002 December DRC EBOV
2007b April DRC EBOV
2007 December Uganda BDBV
2012 November Uganda SUDV
2012 June DRC BDBV
2014a,b March West Africa EBOV
EBOV: Zaire ebolavirus; SUDV, Sudan ebolavirus; BDBV, ebolavirus; DRC, The Democ
aCase counts updated December 17, 2014.
bData source: http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/history/distribution-map [20period, only a small outbreak was reported in 1979, which
occurred in the same area as the 1976 Sudan epidemic
[11]. From 1994 to 1997, several EVD outbreaks were re-
ported in Gabon and Zaire [12], and another human-
pathogenic Ebolavirus, Taï Forest ebolavirus (TAFV), was
isolated from a single case during this period [13]. Since
2000, the number of the EVD outbreaks has increased in
the African continent [14], making the EVD epidemic a
major public health concern in Africa. While EBOV and
SUDV were responsible for almost all, Bundibugyo virus
(BDBV), which first emerged in 2007 in Uganda [15], and
then reemerged in 2012 in DRC [16], was also able to
cause an epidemic.
Geographical distribution
So far, EVD is mainly endemic to the African continent,
especially in West Africa. Other countries, such as the
United States, Thailand, United Kingdom, Canada, and
Spain had sporadic and possibly imported Ebola cases
[22]. The natural environment of the African continent
provides a favorable condition for the survival of Ebola
virus. First, the natural and alternate hosts of Ebola virus
such as fruit bats, apes, and monkeys are widely distrib-
uted in Africa. Second, according to the historical data,
EVD mainly distributes between 10° north and south of
the equator, with the temperature that benefits Ebola
virus survival throughout the year.
Demographic distribution
Ebola virus can infect people at any age group. In some
areas, about 80% of the EVD cases were in adults be-
tween 21 and 60 years old [23], possibly because most976 to 2014
Cases, n Deaths, n Fatality Ref.
284 151 53.2% [10]
318 280 88.1% [4]
34 22 64.7% [11]
52 31 59.6% [12]
315 250 79.4% [12]
60 45 75.0% [12]
425 224 52.7% [17]
122 96 78.7% [18]
143 128 89.5% [19]
264 187 70.8% [20]
149 37 24.8% [15]
14 7 50.0% [21]
52 25 48.1% [16]
19065 7388 38.8% [20]
ratic Republic of the Congo.
].
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active (i.e. hunting for food) and therefore have more
opportunities of being exposed to the pathogen. The fa-
tality rate of EVD for the age group of 21 years and
under is significantly lower than that in the age group of
45 years and older (57% vs. 94%, P < 0.05) [24]. Due to
the ease of transmission from human-to-human via
close contact or possibly via droplets by sneezing and
coughing of patients, medical workers belong to a high-
risk population. Some studies have found that the high-risk
occupations for EVD are nurses, aid nurses, physicians, la-
boratory technicians, and physician assistants. Accordingly,
hospitals, clinics, and Ebola treatment units are fertile for
ebolavirus transmission [25]. Different genetic backgrounds
of affected populations may relate to different susceptibility
to EVD [26], future mechanistic studies should investigate
the role of genetic factors on the development and pro-
gression of EVD.
Virology
Family members and viral genome
Ebolavirus belongs to the Filoviridae family and contains 5
members: EBOV, SUDV, TAFV, BDBV and Reston virus
(RESTV) [27]. With the exception of RESTV, which is
only found in the Philippines, all other four members are
the causative agents of EVD that are endemic to West
Africa. EBOV is the most virulent species, followed by
SUDV. The RESTV is the mildest among these 5 species,
and only causes disease in non-human primates [28].
EBOV is a non-segmented negative-sense single-stranded
RNA virus with filamentous particles, a morphological
characteristic of all Filoviruses [5]. EBOV particles are the
same in width (80 nm) but vary in length (up to 1400 nm),
which can be coiled, toroid or branched. The EBOV gen-
ome is approximately 1.5 kb in length and contains seven
genes encoding nucleoprotein, virion protein (VP) 35,
VP40, glycoprotein (GP), VP30, VP24, and RNA-dependent
polymerase [22].
The unstable RNA genome of EBOV leads to a high
mutation rate [14]. Phylogenetic analysis based on se-
quencing technology is reliable for epidemiological sur-
veillance. In 2014 EVD outbreak, investigators provide
timely information about the origins and the transmission
routes of EBOV, which was crucial in recognizing the
pathogens at the initial period of the outbreak [29]. In the
previous outbreaks, the mutation rates of EBOV were
relatively rapid, ranging from 1.97 × 10−4 to 10.7 × 10−4
nucleotide substitutions/site/years in human populations.
But the low diversity within the EBOV variants revealed
that the high mutation rates did not facilitate the EBOV
evolution process, which was believed to undergo a
bottleneck period [30]. However, the EBOV mutation
rates in the 2014 outbreak strains were as high as 2 × 10−3
nucleotide substitutions/site/years [29], which was onaverage 2 to 3 times higher than that observed in the pre-
vious epidemics. The high viral mutation rate of the 2014
EVD outbreak strains implied the potential of a rapid evo-
lution. The mutant strains of EBOV can be generated
with different virulence, infectivity, tissue tropism, and
the capability of immunosuppression. The viral variants
might be selected by specific pressures, including the im-
mune response, treatment, and the condition of infection.
As the genetic surveillance data suggested, the number of
EBOV lineages increased along with the increased num-
ber of affected populations [29]. The repeated passage of
EBOV in humans can allow the viruses to accumulate
mutations with phenotypic impact. Therefore, EBOV may
become more transmissible or lethal, highlighting the im-
portance of genetic surveillance for the viruses.Immunosuppression function
EBOV is immunosuppressive, which is a major obstacle
for the development of effective vaccination. Deceased
EVD patients usually failed to trigger effective immune
responses after infection; whereas effective immune re-
sponses are frequently sustained in survivors. The roles
of EBOV-encoded proteins in the suppression of host
immune responses have been extensively investigated
in the past decades. Major advances have been reported
on three aspects. First, VP35 and VP24 can function as
important virulence determinants that allow EBOV to
evade the antiviral effect of type I interferon (IFN).
VP35 has been demonstrated to function as an IFN an-
tagonist that inhibits type I IFN responses in Ebola
virus-infected cells [31]. VP24, a structural protein as-
sociated with the membrane, can block IFN signaling
by impairing nuclear accumulation of tyrosine-
phosphorylated STAT1 [32]. Second, EBOV secretory
glycoprotein (sGP), a primary product of the GP gene,
enables the virus to escape from neutrophils and avoid
being wiped out by immune system. sGP, is soluble and
can be secreted in large quantities by infected cells and
inhibit the early activation of neutrophils by binding to
CD16b leading to suppression of anti-viral innate im-
munity. sGP also facilitates EBOV replication [33]. This
partially explains why EBOV can spread rapidly in the
host while evading immune eradication. Lastly, sGP
can serve as a decoy for GP by binding to neutralizing
antibodies produced by the host. Neutralizing anti-
bodies, which defend a cell from being infected by vi-
ruses through binding to antigen and neutralizing its
biological effects, are not usually detected even in the
convalescent survivors. Furthermore, there is evidence
of shared neutralizing epitopes on GP and sGP mole-
cules and sGP is believed to substitute GP from biding
neutralizing antibodies and consequently reducing
antibody titer [34].
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In blood and or other body fluids, or on contaminated sur-
faces, EBOV can survive for hours at room temperature
(20°C−25°C), and for weeks at low temperature (4°C) [17].
EBOV is only moderately heat resistance and can be inac-
tivated by heat treatment (>60°C) for at least 1 hour.
EBOV is also sensitive to ultraviolet light, gamma rays,
and many chemical reagents, including ether, peracetic
acid, sodium hypochlorite, and formaldehyde [35].
Infectious process
Sources of infection
Patients at the contagious stage are the main sources of
human-to-human transmission. The viruses can exist in
body fluids such as blood, semen, and genital secretions
as well as the skin of contagious patients [36,37]. The in-
cubation period is up to 21 days, which is the epidemio-
logical basis for quarantine.
Fever and other EVD symptoms such as headache, fa-
tigue, and diarrhea often appear at the earlier contagious
stages and before significant alterations of the laboratory
indexes, allowing for timely identification of infected pa-
tients [38]. However, the initial clinical signs of EVD lack
specificity. Therefore, laboratory test are indispensible
for a confirmative diagnosis. Polymerase-chain-reaction
(PCR) test for EBOV nucleic acid and the detection for
the viral antigen in the blood can become reliably posi-
tive from 2 to 16 days after the onset of symptoms. Im-
munoglobulin M (IgM) can be detected as early as
2 days after the onset and immunoglobulin G (IgG) usu-
ally appears between 6 and 18 days after the appearance
of the clinical signs [39]. The persistence of IgM and ris-
ing IgG titers are important markers to diagnose EBOV
infection. In successive paired serum samples, a decrease
of IgM titer or an increase (more than four-fold) of IgG
titer, or both can characterize a recent infection [22].
IgM usually disappears within 30 to 168 days after infec-
tion, while IgG can persist for years [39].
The cadaver is also an important source of infection.
The traditional burial rituals in Africa usually involve
close contact with the corpse, which facilitates the
spread of EBOV. Epidemiological data reveal that 68% of
the infected cases in Guinea during the 2014 EVD out-
break were associated with funerals [40].
Convalescent patients may have subclinical EBOV.
Viral RNA can be detected for up to 1 month in vaginal,
rectal, and conjunctival secretions and up to 3 months
in semen samples after the disease onset [36], indicating
the persistence of EBOV in convalescent patients. Al-
though sexual transmission is also possible, there is no
evidence supporting the transmission between convales-
cent patients and their spouses [36].
Asymptomatic carriers of EBOV, who do not become
ill after physical contact with EVD patients, play a verylimited role in the EVD outbreak. Invaded viruses are
often quickly wiped out by the efficient immune re-
sponses, leading to a low viral load and short-time in-
flammatory reaction that disappears in 2–3 days without
subsequent tissue and organ injury. It is commonly be-
lieved that an asymptomatic carrier is not infectious.
This supposition is supported by the field experience in
West Africa [38]. However, the first case of asymptom-
atic carrier was reported in 1996 from the outbreak in
northern Gabon, and the analysis of nucleoproteins iso-
lated from the carrier and EVD patients revealed no dif-
ferences [41]. In addition, the occult EVD infection
usually occurs in those racial groups living in the trop-
ical rainforest regions. The prevalence of occult EVD in-
fection is as high as 10% in the rainforest areas in the
Guinea - Congo Basin [42]. These data suggest that the
existence of asymptomatic carriers is possibly because of
the racial and population differences, and/or diverse
genetic background, rather than infection with low-
virulence mutants of EBOV.
EVD is a typical zoonotic disease, but the wild reser-
voir of EBOV is still unclear. Non-human primates, like
apes or monkeys, have long been considered as import-
ant sources of infection to humans; however, these pri-
mates might not be original reservoir species because
they could be killed by this infection [28]. Since the first
EVD outbreak in 1976, many studies have tried to iden-
tify the natural reservoirs. An experimental study inocu-
lated African plants and animals with EBOV in the
laboratory, and detected high titers of the virus both in
asymptomatic fruit bats and insectivorous bats [43]. Al-
though no solid link between EBOV and bats is estab-
lished, this evidence provides a promising clue of
potential candidates. During the 2001 to 2003 Ebola out-
breaks in humans and apes in Gabon and DRC more
than a thousand animals were collected from the epi-
demic areas for testing. EBOV RNA and antibodies were
found in three species of fruit bats with asymptomatic
infections [44]. It is a milestone to find natural reservoir
species with asymptomatic or subclinical infection. The
distribution of habitats, activity range, and natural char-
acteristics of the reservoir animals, may explain the
sporadic nature and periodicity of EVD outbreaks, and
changes in these factors may increase the opportunity of
animal-to-human transmission of EBOV [22].
Route of transmission
Close contact is the most important route of EBOV trans-
mission. EBOV can survive in body fluids of patients or
cadavers for days, and invade into recipients’ bodies via
mucous membranes and/or broken skin. Besides the body
fluids and skin of EVD patients or cadavers, the virus also
can spread via recently contaminated items like clothes
[41,45,46]. The first patients of the past EVD outbreaks
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ill or dead EBOV-infected non-human primates or other
mammals, while most of the subsequent cases were asso-
ciated with hospital-mediated dissemination and intra-
familial transmission [47].
Oral transmission is another important route in Africa.
Sick or virus-carrying animals can be easily hunted for
food. Consumption of bushmeat that is not cooked thor-
oughly is a common way of exposure to infected ani-
mals. Fruit bat is possible candidate of the EBOV
reservoir animals [44,48]. Fruit bats mainly distribute
throughout equatorial Africa and can spread EBOV dur-
ing hunting [49]. Although EBOV can be inactivated by
heat, consumption of freshly killed animals is still very
dangerous. The high lethality of EBOV invading through
oral transmission was demonstrated by non-human pri-
mate experiments [50]. The putative first human victims
of the outbreak in Gabon [51] and in DRC [49] were as-
sociated with consumption of chimpanzees and fruit
bats, respectively, which led to the subsequent human-
to-human transmission. Notably, EBOV was discovered
in pigs in the Philippines in July 2008 [52], highlighting
the possibility of the wide range of potential animal
hosts, especially domestic animals.
Nosocomial infection also plays an important role in
EBOV transmission, especially in regions with inadequate
hygienic resources. The 1976 outbreaks of Ebola virus in
Sudan and Zaire were due to the reuse of contaminated
needles [45,46]. The incubation period of EVD is on aver-
age 6.3 days for cases with injection exposure, and 9.5 days
for those infected through contact transmission [22].
Healthcare providers are usually at high risk of being ex-
posed to contaminated needles, samples, corpses, and/or
biological materials. Therefore, it is vital to operate with
standard protective procedures and equipments.
Airborne transmission of EBOV is still in debate [53].
According to the previous EVD outbreaks, infection
does not occur without direct physical contact, even
when in the presence of EVD patients in confined
spaces, suggesting EVD is not transmitted via airborne
routes. Given the low viral concentration in the lungs, it
would be difficult for EBOV to spread through airborne
transmission [54]. Only pigs with EVD, which accumu-
late large numbers of EBOV in their lungs, can spread
virus to the nonhuman primates through airborne trans-
mission [55]. However, EBOV may survive in the saliva
of severe cases and infect people who are splashed with
contaminated droplets. This suggests a risk of airborne
EBOV transmission between severe patients and the
medical personnel caring them.
Susceptibility
All human races are susceptible to EBOV, but the out-
come of EVD depends on the transmission route, viralload, age, and probably genetic background. The case fa-
tality rate of patients infected by injection is much higher
than those by contact exposure [22]. The case fatality rate
of patients with high viral load (>107 copies/ml) is ap-
proximately 3 times higher than that of those with low
viral load (<104 copies/ml). Patients over 45 years of age
have a higher case fatality rate than those under the age of
21 [56]. Results from the experiment of a novel EBOV in-
fection mouse model suggested that host genetic back-
ground played a significant role in determining the
prognosis of EVD [26]. Although infected with mouse-
adapted EBOV under the same conditions, different gen-
etic backgrounds had different outcomes ranging from
complete resistance to lethal disease. The evidence of ani-
mal experiments is consistent with epidemiological data
(high percentage of asymptomatic carriers in the rainforest
racial group) and clinical characteristics (significant differ-
ences among the human disease spectrum of the infected
patients), suggesting that genetic diversity plays a role in
EVD pathogenesis and/or resistance.Prevention and control
Since there are no specific medications broadly available
to cure EVD, the most important thing is to prevent sus-
ceptible people from the infection and restrict spreading.
This requires the government, public health facilities,
medical units, and individuals to make concerted efforts.
Military forces are indispensable when local public health
systems are overwhelmed or in the case where the EVD
epidemic goes out of control.
Sufficient political support from the government is cru-
cial for the prevention and control of the Ebola epidemic.
First, a strong public health infrastructure and medical re-
serve should be established and improved. Most severe
EVD epidemics occurred in areas where the health systems
were overwhelmed or failed to identify and isolate the in-
fection cases in a timely fashion [57]. Second, contact tra-
cing and quarantine policies should be strengthened.
Briefly, persons of a close contact with EVD patient should
be monitored if the related symptoms are present within
21 days. New cases should be identified and isolated
quickly, and the cycle should be repeated until no patient
emerges. A well-designed and appropriately operated dis-
ease surveillance system should be in place when a sus-
pected case is reported (Figure 1). Third, considering the
absence of effective treatment and the high case fatality, it
is reasonable to circumvent research ethics and authorize
the promising experimental vaccines or drugs for emer-
gency use. Lastly, epidemiological and clinical data of Ebola
should be collected vigorously and systematically in the en-
demic areas. This is the basis of epidemiological or genetic
surveillance and relies on the coordination of public orga-
nizations and agencies [29].
Case report







Is the case confirmed
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Contacts: observation or quarantine for 21 days
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up to 21 days? 
no







Figure 1 Case confirmation: Ebola virus disease.
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tasks: to optimize the use of available medical resources
and to avoid nosocomial infections. Clinical assessment
could triage EVD patients into three categories: those
who are able to provide self-care, not in shock, just
hypovolemic; those who are unable to provide self-care,
have hypovolemic, but not in shock; and those in shock
with organ failure [58]. This grouping strategy can help
save medical resources and achieve maximum effect on
disease control. Epidemiological data have demonstrated
that health care providers are facing an increased occu-
pational risk of Ebola infection [25]. All hospitals, la-
boratories and other health care facilities should follow
the established standard procedure when treating pa-
tients as well as collecting and handling patients’ speci-
mens [59]. In addition, the adequate use of personal
protective equipment recommended by the U.S. CDC is
an obligation for health care providers to ensure that no
skin is exposed to any possible source of infection.
Individuals in EVD endemic areas should take prophy-
lactic measures to avoid any possible risk of getting in-
fected. Certain lifestyle changes such as regular hand
washing, avoid gatherings, and changes in the traditional
rituals may significantly reduce the risk of Ebola trans-
mission [57]. Contact with and the consumption of wild
animals that may be the reservoirs of EBOV, like bats
and primates, should be avoided. Contaminated objects
of patients, like clothes and towels, should be also disin-
fected or burned without delay.Military forces should respond in a timely manner to
EVD outbreak if it becomes an increasing threat to the
international society. In the most affected countries, the
EVD epidemic not only caused great casualties, but also
brought the collapse of economic and health infrastruc-
tures. Displacement of masses of refugees can spread the
disease rapidly to nearby developing countries and even
developed countries, leading to an exponential increase
of infected cases and death tolls. Thus, effective control
of EVD outbreak is not only an emergency issue to med-
ical community, but also a health protection mission to
military force. With the quick response capability and
well-organized deployment, the military experience has
demonstrated how to orchestrate efficient medical care
to mass casualties in an austere environment within a
limited period. Besides, military forces can ensure effect-
ive evacuations to keep health workers flowing, and
build temporary isolated units and treatment facilities
like the mobile army surgical hospital (MASH). During
the 2014 West Africa EVD outbreak, many international
volunteers and organizations took care of thousands of
EVD patients in the epidemic areas. But due to inad-
equate medical resources and lack of logistical support,
those organizations were overwhelmed and failed to stop
the spread of EBOV. In September 2014, both Médecins
Sans Frontières (MSF) and the European Community
Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) who had played a
major role in the international effort in controlling out-
break asked international military medical assistance
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declared Ebola a global security threat, and created the
Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER),
which was the first health mission in its history [61]. The
US, UK, Germany, and China responded promptly. The
US and UK sent troops to established isolation units and
treatment centers in Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively.
Approximately 5,000 German troops volunteered to work
in the West Africa [62]. China also dispatched several test-
ing and medical teams including military health units to
set up hospitals in Sierra Leone and to establish or up-
grade lab screening systems, and participate in the treat-
ment of EVD [63].Conclusion
As the EVD outbreak is continuously raging in West
Africa, it is a daunting task to control the outbreak.
Since the first Ebola outbreak in 1976, there have been
limited measures to reduce the high mortality. Future
efforts need to focus on developing effective vaccines,
drugs and therapies. More studies are needed to con-
firm the pathophysiology of the infection in order to
identify new targets for medical intervention. Although
it is necessary to speed up the pace of developing ef-
fective vaccine and therapeutics for the prevention and
treatment of EVD, public health prophylaxis is the most
important issue at present to control the spread of this
disease cost-effectively. International cooperation, es-
pecially the cooperation between medical and military
systems is critical to prevent and control the epidemic
of EVD.
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